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Chinese Bilateral Judgment Enforcement
Treaties
KING FUNG TSANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bilateral judgment enforcement treaties entered into between China
and foreign countries (hereinafter bilateral treaties) are still very much a
mystery after three decades in use.1 There are two official ways for a
foreign judgment to be enforced in China,2 either through “reciprocity”
or through a bilateral treaty.3 Commentators have suffered from a number
of misconceptions about bilateral treaties. These misconceptions range
from regarding bilateral treaties as unimportant,4 overgeneralizing the
*King Fung Tsang, Assistant Professor, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, LL.M., J.D.
(Columbia), S.J.D. (Georgetown).
1. The first enforcement treaty entered into by China was the Judicial Assistance Treaty in
Civil and Commercial Affairs, May 4, 1987.
2. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by President of
the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991, effective 2012) arts. 281-82(China) (hereinafter,
Civil Procedure Law).
3. It is possible to argue that there are two more ways to recognize or enforce foreign
judgments. First, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan all have entered into specific enforcement
arrangements. However, due to their respective unique status within China’s legal system, it is clear
that none of these arrangements are regarded as treaties. Second, for the recognition of foreign
divorce judgment, it will be recognized unless (1) it is not legally effective, (2) the judgment
rendering state does not have jurisdiction, (3) the defendant was not properly summoned and absent
from the proceedings, (4) there is a parallel proceeding on the same divorce case in China; the
Chinese court has already made a judgment on the same case; or China has already recognized a
third country judgment on the same case, or (5) the foreign judgment was contrary to the basic legal
principles of China, sovereignty, security or public order. See Supreme People’s Court, Opinions
on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce
Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, 64 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO 61 (2000) (Chinese
text). Ironically, despite both technically falling into the “reciprocity” branch, the Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan arrangements are closer to the bilateral treaties, while the recognition of foreign
divorce judgments does not require reciprocity. See Supreme People’s Court, Interpretation of the
SPC on the Application of the PRC Civil Procedure Law art. 544 (2015), www.ipkey.org/en/iplaw-document/download/2649/3380/23 (hereinafter 2015 Interpretation).
4. Duelling with Dragons: Managing Business Disputes in Today’s China (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.jurisconferences.com/2011/duelling-with-dragons-managing-business-disputes-intodays-china-september-20-2011/. (“Unfortunately, the [bilateral treaties] are of limited application
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similarities between them5 or confusing them with “reciprocity.”6
Moreover, there has been little discussion on their effectiveness, despite
the fact that these bilateral treaties serve as the best available precedents
for China in her consideration on whether to enter into multinational
enforcement conventions, such as the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements7 (hereinafter Hague Convention). It can be noted that
few commentators have ever made the comparison between the proposed
Hague Convention and the bilateral treaties.8
This article seeks to establish a true understanding of bilateral
treaties through an empirical survey of the 33 bilateral treaties of judicial
assistance China has entered into with foreign countries, the relevant
judicial cases, and government data relating to them. From the facts
obtained through this survey, it is argued that these treaties deserve much
more attention than they currently receive and efforts should be exerted
to understand them properly. While this article cannot realistically
resolve all the uncertainties surrounding bilateral treaties, it can strive to
identify the right issues that demand further attention from courts and
scholars in the future. Finally, the article will discuss how these existing
bilateral treaties will have a bearing on whether China will enter into the
Hague Convention.
Section B provides background on the enforcement regime of China
and existing bilateral treaties. In particular, it seeks to dispel the
misperception that bilateral treaties are not important due to the lack of
such treaties with China’s major trading partners. Section C looks into
the content of each of the treaties. It shows the inappropriateness of
exaggerating the similarities between the treaties, and the danger of
confusing bilateral treaties and “reciprocity” when enforcing foreign
since China does not have judicial assistance arrangements with many of its key trading partners,
including the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.”).
5. See MICHAEL MOSER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA, 398 (Michael Moser ed., 2012).
6. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a
US Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 767 (2004) (“the [Civil
Procedure Law’s] standard of review provision does not specify the circumstances under which
a Chinese court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. In practice, however, [it
is] reflected in the bilateral treaties for judicial assistance between China and a number of foreign
countries.”) See also JIANG WEI & BANGQING SUN, CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 381 (2008)
(summarizing bases of enforcement rejection into four grounds while failing to distinguish the two
branches).
7. Hague
Conference
on
Private
International
Law,
Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements, Nov. 25, 1965, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/full-text/?cid=98.
8. One commentator did compare the Hague Convention against the jurisdictional regime of
China, See Guangjian Tu, The Hague Choice of Court Convention – A Chinese Perspective, 55 AM.
J. COMP. L. 346, 347-49 (2007).
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judgments. The uncertainties in the provisions of the bilateral treaties are
also highlighted. Section D examines the enforcement cases involving the
bilateral treaties and further shows how the current judicial practices have
contributed to the uncertainties associated with them. Finally, based on
the findings of the above sections, Section E discusses whether China
should join the Hague Convention.
II. BACKGROUND
China’s current regime on enforcement of foreign judgments started
in 1982 when the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
(For Trial Implementation) was passed.9 Article 204 of the Civil
Procedure Law (For Trial Implementation) provides that a foreign
judgment can be enforced in China if either (1) there exists a treaty
between China and the judgment rendering country (hereinafter, F110), or
(2) the foreign judgment is enforceable on the principle of “reciprocity.”11
This two-way regime continues despite a number of amendments to the
Civil Procedure Law.12 The current version of the regime can be found in
Articles 281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Law.13
Article 281 sets out the procedures for recognition of a foreign
judgment. In order to have a foreign judgment recognized or enforced in
China, a party may apply directly to the intermediate people’s court with
jurisdiction or apply to the foreign court and request recognition and
enforcement by the people’s court in accordance with the provisions of
an international treaty, or under the principle of reciprocity.14

9. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Implementation)
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, effective Oct. 1,
1982). Prior to the passing of the law, there were reports of enforcement of judgments from the
Soviet Union and Germany. See also CHENGDI YUAN, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (2003).
10. Similarly, “F2” will be used to refer to judgment enforcing country. Republic of China
(for Trial Implementation), supra note 9.
11. Id. (“When a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China is entrusted by a foreign
court with the execution of a final judgment or order, the people’s court shall examine it in
accordance with any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China
or on the principle of reciprocity. If the court deems that the judgment or order does not violate the
fundamental principles of the law of the People’s Republic of China or her national and social
interests, it shall order to recognize the validity of the judgment or order and execute it according
to the procedure specified in this Law; otherwise, the people’s court shall return the judgment or
order to the foreign court.”).
12. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by President of
the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 9, 1991, effective 2007) arts. 265-68 (China); Civil Procedure
Law, supra note 2.
13. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2.
14. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 281.
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Article 282 then sets out the substantive requirements:
After examining an application or request for recognition and
enforcement of an effective judgment or ruling of a foreign court in
accordance with an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the
People’s Republic of China or under the principle of reciprocity, a
people’s court shall issue a ruling to recognize the legal force of the
judgment or ruling and issue an order for enforcement as needed to
enforce the judgment or ruling according to the relevant provisions of
this Law if the people’s court deems that the judgment or ruling does
not violate the basic principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of
China and the sovereignty, security and public interest of the People’s
Republic of China. If the judgment or ruling violates the basic
principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of China or the
sovereignty, security or public interest of the People’s Republic of
China, the people’s court shall not grant recognition and
enforcement.15

Thus, a foreign judgment will generally be enforced16 if:
(1) The foreign judgment is legally effective;
(2) There is (i) a bilateral treaty or (ii) reciprocity between China
and F1; and
(3) The foreign judgment does not violate the basic principles of the
laws of the People’s Republic of China and the sovereignty, security and
public interest of China.17
In spite of its long history, the general consensus on the Chinese
enforcement regime, in particular of foreign countries, is one of
suspicion. It is said that “[e]nforcement of [foreign] court judgments …
in the People’s Republic of China has often been considered both
challenging and unpredictable.”18 For foreign companies doing business
with China, the conventional wisdom is to advise these companies to
enter into an arbitration agreement with their counterparts in China
regarding dispute resolution.19 While the legal system of China has a lot
to do with the unsatisfactory state of the enforcement regime,20 the

15. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 282.
16. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 546. For ease of reference, “enforce” or
“enforcement” will be used to cover both concepts unless otherwise specified.
17. Enforcing Your Judgment in China: The Truth 2, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Oct. 26,
2016), http://www.kwm.com/en/hk/knowledge/downloads/enforcing-your-judgement-in-china20160915.
18. MOSER, supra note 5, at 381.
19. Id. at 2-4.
20. See Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the
Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 85-7 (2002) (citing inter alia local
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negative perception of the current regime in China must also be attributed
to the uncertainties in the laws.21
Of the two types of enforcement, bilateral treaties have received
very little attention. It is usual for commentators to lay out the two types
at the outset and then instantly brush aside bilateral treaties for their
insignificance.22 This is the first and most common misconception of
bilateral treaties.
Their apparent insignificance is due to the lack of such treaties with
the major trading partners of China, such as the USA, Japan, Korea and
Germany.23 This network of enforcement treaties has been regarded as
“patchy.”24 All China has at the moment are bilateral treaties with 33
individual countries that contain arrangements on judgment
enforcement.25 China is also not a party to any multinational convention,
such as the Hague Convention, that specializes in the enforcement of
foreign judgments.26 In addition, it has also been said that those countries
which have entered into enforcement treaties with China have mainly
been developing countries.27 This all suggests that bilateral treaties are
insignificant to judgment enforcements.
Although it is true that China has never entered into bilateral
enforcement treaties with her largest trading partners, it does not
necessarily mean that the countries with which she has entered into
bilateral treaties are insignificant. To date, China has entered into Sino-

protectionism and government interference in favor of state-owned enterprises as reasons for
difficulty in enforcing foreign judgment in China).
21. Yuan, supra note 6, at 763 (calling the enforcement regime of China “sketchy, skeletal,
and replete with ambiguity”).
22. Duelling with Dragons: Managing Business Disputes in Today’s China, supra note 4.
23. MOSER, supra note 5, at 406. (“Although enforcement is in theory possible in accordance
with several treaties to which the PRC is a party – including enforcement treaties with jurisdictions
such as France and Italy – the network of treaties is patchy, and there are no relevant treaties
between China and most of its major trading partners.”).
24. MOSER, supra note 5, at 395.
25. See infra Table 1.
26. Note that China has acceded to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (1969), which provides for enforcement of foreign judgments on oil pollution
cases in limited circumstances. However, contrary to the view of some commentators, the Bilateral
Treaty on Encouragement and Protection of Investment between China and Australia does not
contain enforcement arrangements on enforcement of foreign judgment. Cf. ZHENG SOPHIA TANG
ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 149 n. 31 (Edward Elgar, 1st ed.
2016).
27. King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 17, at 2. (“While [the bilateral treaties] may sound
promising, China has to date not acceded to any international convention or multilateral treaty in
this regard and has only entered into a limited number of bilateral enforcement treaties, most of
which are with developing nations. China is yet to enter into applicable bilateral treaties with its
major trading partners (including England, Germany, Australia and the USA).”).
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foreign judicial assistance treaties with 36 countries,28 of which 33
include enforcement of foreign judgments.29 It is noted that Singapore,
Thailand and South Korea have entered into Sino-foreign judicial
assistance treaties with China, but treaties with these three countries do
not cover enforcement of foreign judgments.30 Instead, they represent
agreement on other areas such as cooperation in obtaining evidence,
service of process, arbitration, exchange of judicial information and
criminal areas. These other areas are certainly relevant to judgment
enforcement but are out of the scope of this article.31
Table 1 sets out the 33 countries that have agreed on judgment
enforcement, the effective date of the treaties, 32 trading volumes33 and
relevant percentage in China’s overall trading volume in 2015.
Table 1 - Bilateral Treaty Countries
Country

Treaty Effective
Date

2015 Trade Vol
(in 10,000 USD)

% of Total
Trade

France
Poland*

1988/02/08
1988/02/13

5137005
1708682

1.300%
0.432%

Mongolia*

1990/10/29

536608

0.136%

Romania*

1993/01/22

445719

0.113%

Russia*
Byelorussia*

1993/11/14
1993/11/29

6801554
175972

1.721%
0.045%

28. Under Chinese law, other than judgment enforcement, “judicial assistance” can include
service of process for a foreign proceeding, taking evidence for a foreign proceeding, and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Yuan, supra note 6, at 764.
29. China has entered into 36 Sino-foreign judicial assistance treaties, but only 33 of them
include arrangements on enforcement of foreign judgment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Status of
Sino-Foreign
Treaties
on
Civil
and
Criminal
Judicial
Assistance
(2016),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/wgdwdjdsfhzty_674917/t1215630.sht
ml. The table below shows the types of judicial assistance covered by the 36 treaties.
Areas Covered by Judicial Assistance Treaties

No. of
Countries

Judgment
Enforcement

Evidence

33

36

Service
of
Process
36

Arbitration

Info
Exchange

Criminal

Judicial
Record

28

36

19

1

30. Some commentators only refer to Singapore and South Korea for not including judgment
enforcement arrangements. This is certainly not correct. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 149.
31. See infra Section IV(B)(1) on how improper service of legal documents could be regarded
as a ground of refusal for judgment enforcement under public policy.
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 29.
33. See Total Value of Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/ Destination,
NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01.
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Spain

1994/01/01

2743954

0.694%

Ukraine*

1994/01/19

707151

0.179%

Cuba
Italy

1994/03/26
1995/01/01

221637
4465424

0.056%
1.130%

Egypt*

1995/05/31

1287642

0.326%

Bulgaria*

1995/06/30

179157

0.045%

Kazakhstan*
Turkey*

1995/07/11
1995/10/26

1429019
2155148

0.361%
0.545%

Cyprus

1996/01/11

63958

0.016%

Greece

1996/06/29

395048

0.100%

Hungary*
Kirghizia*

1997/03/21
1997/09/26

807300
434069

0.204%
0.110%

Uzbekistan*

1998/08/29

349582

0.088%

Tadzhikistan*

1998/09/02

184743

0.047%

Morocco
Vietnam*

1999/11/26
1999/12/25

341870
9584877

0.086%
2.425%

Tunisia

2000/07/20

142123

0.036%

Laos*

2001/12/15

277310

0.070%

Lithuania*
United Arab Emirates*

2002/01/19
2005/04/12

134969
4853419

0.034%
1.228%

Korea DPR

2006/01/21

551061

0.139%

Argentina

2011/10/09

1452259

0.367%

Peru
Algeria*

2012/05/25
2012/06/16

1430489
835071

0.362%
0.211%

Kuwait*

2013/06/06

1126974

0.285%

Brazil

2014/08/16

7150159

1.809%

Bosnia and Herzegovina*
Total

2014/10/12

11371
58121324

0.003%
14.703%

* Belt and Road Countries34

While countries like the USA, Japan and South Korea – the three
largest trading partners of China – are missing from the list, there are
bilateral treaties with Vietnam and Brazil, the 9th and 14th largest trading
partners with China in 2015.35 More importantly, combined together,
these 33 countries constitute 14.70% of the overall trading volume of
China in 2015. While they are a minority, one cannot dispute that the

34. For a list of 65 Belt and Road countries and their general profile, see Country Profile,
H.K. TRADE DEV. COUNCIL, http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/country-profiles.
35. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, supra note 33.
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aggregate trading volume with these countries is still a sizeable part of
overall trading activities and warrants close attention. In fact, as Table 2
shows, not even the USA, which has long been the largest trading partner
of China, has such a proportion in the overall trading volume with China.
Table 2 - Trade Volume of Bilateral Treaty Countries vs USA
(2006-2015)
Countries with Bilateral Treaty
No. Trade
%
of Year-toVol (in Total
Year
10,000
Trade
Change
USD)

USA
Trade Vol
(in
10,000
USD)

% of
Total
Trade

Yearto-Year
Change

2015
2014

33
31

58121324
55834967

14.70%
12.98%

1.72%
0.96%

55702297
55512355

14.09%
12.91%

1.19%
0.38%

2013
2012

30
28

50008710
44341751

12.02%
11.47%

0.56%
0.10%

52074870
48467425

12.52%
12.53%

-0.01%
0.27%

2011
2010

27
27

41379050
33103561

11.36%
11.13%

0.23%
-0.02%

44658227
38538528

12.26%
12.96%

-0.70%
-0.55%

2009
2008

27
27

24607458
30701078

11.15%
11.98%

-0.83%
0.75%

29826260
33374348

13.51%
13.02%

0.49%
-0.86%

2007
2006

27
26

24427283
17571485

11.22%
9.98%

1.24%

30206716
26265947

13.88%
14.92%

-1.04%

Year

Average

0.52%

-0.09%

In 2006, there were only 26 countries that had signed a bilateral
treaty with China, with the aggregate trading volume accounting for just
9.98% of the total trading volume of China. This can be contrasted with
14.92% of the USA during the same period. However, the gap has since
closed as the number of bilateral treaties has increased. In 2014, the
treaties countries’ trading volume exceeded that of the USA for the first
time in history. The lead of the treaties countries continues to grow as
their trading volume accounted for 14.70% of the total trading volume of
China in 2015, when the USA only accounted for 14.09% in the same
period. Over the ten years from 2006 to 2015, the average year-to-year
change in trading volume of the treaties countries was 0.52% compared
to -0.09% of the USA. This clearly shows that the importance of the
treaties countries continues to climb, while that of the United States is in
decline, or at least has plateaued.36

36. Treaties countries: t = 2.0747, df = 8, p = 0.0717; USA: t = -0.3726, df = 8, p = 0.7191
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Another reason for the lack of attention to these bilateral treaties is
the fact that most of these countries are developing countries. 37 In fact,
treaties with these developing countries require more attention because
of the trading potential in the future. For example, China, Brazil and
Russia represent three of the four members of BRIC.38 The 33 countries
also included 8 of the 15 members of the former Soviet Union.39 More
recently, as China is leading in the much discussed “One Belt One Road”
project, it is important to note that 22 of the 33 treaties countries also
happen to be Belt and Road countries.40
Table 3 - Belt and Road Countries (2006-2015)
21 Countries (Without Iran)

22 Countries (With Iran)

% of Total
Trade

Change

2015

Trade
Volume (in
10,000
USD)
34026337

%
of
Total
Trade

Change

-0.26%

Trade
Volume
(in 10,000
USD)
37409093

8.61%

9.46%

-0.61%

2014
2013

38165468
34662097

8.87%
8.33%

0.54%
0.22%

43349702
38604748

10.08%
9.28%

0.80%
0.23%

2012
2011

31373658
28310018

8.11%
7.77%

0.34%
0.53%

35020242
32820358

9.06%
9.01%

0.04%
0.78%

2010
2009

21543458
15978575

7.24%
7.24%

0.01%
-0.60%

24482565
18100483

8.23%
8.20%

0.03%
-0.73%

2008
2007

20100914
15435279

7.84%
7.09%

0.75%
0.86%

22876677
17494244

8.92%
8.04%

0.89%
0.99%

2006
Average

10971431

6.23%

12416172

7.05%

0.26%

0.27%

As Table 3 shows, there has been a continual increase in trading
volumes of the 22 Belt and Road countries with China, reaching 8.61%
of trading volumes of China in 2015. As the Belt and Road project
continues to develop, it is expected that the trading volume between
China and these 22 countries will increase at an even faster rate.

37. See KING & WOOD MALLESONS, supra note 17.
38. For economic growth of BRIC, see International Trade Statistics 2015, WORLD TRADE
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf.
39. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Mar.
10, 2017), https://global.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union.
40. See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, supra note 34.
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Finally, China has reportedly entered into a new bilateral treaty with
Iran recently.41 Once it comes into effect, it will further boost the
proportion of the treaties countries in the overall trading volume of China
from 14.70% to 15.56% based on the 2015 trading numbers. The share of
the total trading volume of Belt and Road countries will also increase
from 8.61% to 9.46%.
In short, a sizeable part of China’s trading activities are starting to
fall into the bilateral treaties regime. It is also likely that this regime’s
importance is going to increase over time compared with the
“reciprocity” arrangements. Accordingly, the real question is not whether
the bilateral treaties are significant, but whether they are effective in
enforcing foreign judgments. To answer that question, the next section
looks at the substantive content of the bilateral treaties and compares
them with each other.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTS OF THE BILATERAL TREATIES
A common misconception about bilateral treaties is that there are
many similarities between them.42 However, this is untrue. While they do
share some similarities at a very general level, it is dangerous for
litigating parties to rely on such general similarities in pursuing
enforcement based on a particular treaty. This section shows the
differences between the bilateral treaties in terms of the scope, refusal
grounds for enforcement and other relevant aspects.
Another problem in the contemporary analysis of bilateral treaties
is the practice of confusing the discussion with reciprocity.43 As will be
shown below, some of the treaties’ provisions are in fact contrary to the
general provisions of the Civil Procedure Law (which applies to
reciprocity). Although the status of international treaties in the hierarchy
of the Chinese legal system is not clear, it is generally believed that
treaties enjoy a higher legal standing than domestic law.44 For
41. See Sino-Iran Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Complete Strategic Partnership
Relationship, XINHUANET (Jan. 23, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-01/23/
c_1117872814.htm. While the treaty is not publicly available, it is believed that it contains
provisions regarding judgment enforcement, See Ministry of Justice, Delegates participating in
Sino-Iran Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs Negotiation, http://
www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2014-12/17/content_5890548.htm?node=24391.
42. See MOSER, supra note 5, at 2.
43. See Yuan, supra note 6.
44. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE
LEIGH 163 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005). (“In regard to the legal status of treaties in Chinese
law, the Chinese Constitution does not contain any specific provisions on the matters. However, in
practice… if a treaty to which China is a party contains provisions inconsistent with Chinese laws,
treaty provisions should prevail, unless China has made reservations to relevant provisions.”).
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discrepancies between bilateral treaties and the requirements in the Civil
Procedure Law, it is specifically provided in Article 260 that the
provisions of the treaties will prevail.45 Thus, identifying those
discrepancies becomes significant. Differences between the treaties in
terms of scope, refusal grounds and enforcement procedures will be
examined below.
A. Scope
While all the bilateral treaties are designed to enforce foreign “civil”
judgments, the definitions of “civil” in fact vary across different treaties.
The substantial differences are shown in the tables below.
Table 4 - Scope of the Bilateral Treaties
No. of Countries
Civil

33

Criminal damages

33

Commerce

27

Labor

16

Marriage

12

Family

10

Economic

5

Fee

5

Status

2

Succession

1

Exclusion

5

Chinese scholars have generalized the scopes into just three types of
judgments, namely, civil, commercial and criminal compensation.46
Table 4 shows much more variety in the types of judgment covered by
the bilateral treaties. Although it is clear that all the bilateral treaties cover
civil judgments and damages which compensate the victims in criminal
judgments, the treaties also cover various other types of judgments,
including those related to commerce, labor, marriage, family, economic
45. Id. Where there is any discrepancy between an international treaty concluded or acceded
to by the People’s Republic of China and this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall
prevail, except clauses to which the People’s Republic of China has declared reservations.
46. TANG ET AL., supra note 26.
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aspects, court fees, status and succession. To make it more complicated,
five countries have also included explicit exclusions on certain sub-types
of judgments from the aforementioned categories.47 Table 5 shows the
different
combinations
of
the
types
above.
Table 5 - Scope of the Bilateral Treaties (Combinations)
Combination
1

Civil & Criminal damages

No. of
Countries
3

2
3

Civil, Criminal damages & Commercial
Civil, Criminal damages & Fee

3
3

9%
9%

4
5

Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Status
Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Labor

2
2

6%
6%

6
7

Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial & Family
Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial &
Exclusion
Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor &
Family

1
5

3%
15%

1

3%

9

Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor &
Marriage

3

9%

10

Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor,
Family & Fee

1

3%

11

Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor,
Family & Marriage
Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor,
Succession & Marriage
Civil, Criminal damages, Commercial, Labor,
Family, Marriage & Economic
Total

3

9%

1

3%

5

15%

33

100%

8

12
13

Percentage
9%

Among the 33 bilateral treaties, there are 13 different combinations
created out of the 11 different types of judgments referred to in Table 4.
As Table 5 shows, no combination has more than five countries. Thus,
while prima facie, the scopes of the treaties are all “civil,” they could be
substantially different. To make them more different, even if two treaties
have the same scope on paper, they might not always mean the same
things. For example, both the treaties with Turkey and Egypt have only

47. See bilateral treaties with Spain, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Peru and Tunisia.
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included civil and criminal damages within their scope.48 However, an
article of the treaty with Egypt49 contains references to judgments relating
to contract, tort, immovable properties, succession, family, status and
business, while the treaty with Turkey does not contain such references.
It can, of course, be argued that the word “civil” in the Egypt treaty should
be broadly interpreted to include all these additional types of judgments,
but can the same be said of the Turkey treaty? What about those five
treaties that expressly include civil, criminal damages, commercial, labor,
family, marriage and economic aspects (combination 13 in Table 5)? 50
These treaties apparently define the word “civil” much more narrowly
than the treaty with Egypt. Thus, it is dangerous to over-generalize the
similarities between the treaties in terms of scope even if they all broadly
cover “civil” judgments in general. If the differences in scope appear
confusing, the refusal grounds for enforcement are even more so.
B. Refusal grounds
Once it is established that the foreign judgment falls within the
scope of the relevant bilateral treaty, the foreign judgment is presumably
enforceable subject to a number of specific refusal grounds. 51 It is
common for commentators to summarize these refusal grounds generally.
For example, one commentator summarized the refusal grounds as
follows:
1) the foreign court judgment was issued by a foreign court that would
have lacked jurisdiction under PRC law;
2) the defendant was not served with proper notice of the foreign
proceedings …;
3) an effective judgment has been issued by a People’s court for the
same cause of action between the same parties; or

48. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt,
art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil,
Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Turk., art. 21, Sept. 28, 1992, [no official citation
available].
49. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt,
art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available].
50. See bilateral treaties with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Belarus.
51. Three treaties do not specify any refusal grounds per se, but express them as positive
conditions for enforcement. In practice however, the effect should be the same. See Article 17 of
Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Hung., art. 17, Oct. 9, 1996, [no
official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Laos,
art. 21, Jan. 25, 1999, [no official citation available], and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and
Criminal Affairs, China-Cyprus, art. 25, Apr. 25, 1995, [no official citation available].
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4) recognition and enforcement of the foreign court judgment would
cause harm to the national, social or public interests of the PRC.52

Similarly, it is also common for commentators to discuss the refusal
grounds of the bilateral treaties and reciprocity arrangements as if they
were the same.53 However, none of these practices could stand detailed
analysis of the treaties.
Table 6 - Refusal Grounds
No. of Country

Percentage

Effective Judgment

33

100%

Jurisdiction

33

100%

Due Process

33

100%

Res judicata

33

100%

Public policy

33

100%

Governing law on Status

2

6%

Unenforceability under F2 Law

2

6%

Inconformity of Document

1

3%

Total

33

100%

52. See MOSER supra note 5, 398. See also Jie Huang, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS 74 (Hart Publishing, 1st ed. 2004).
(“Widely recognized by scholarship and bilateral… treaties ratified by Mainland China, refusal is
generally based on the following four grounds: (1) incompetent indirect jurisdiction; (2) unfair
procedures; (3) res judicata; and (4) public policy exception.”). There are however different
categorizations by other commentators.
53. See Zhang supra note 20, at 88-89 (“The [Civil Procedural Law] does not dictate the
conditions under which a people’s court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment.
In practice, however, the people’s courts may strike down a petition or request for recognition and
enforcement if the foreign judgment is found to have one of the following defects: [(1) lack of
jurisdiction; (2) ineffective foreign judgment; (3) due process; (4) parallel proceedings or (5) public
policy].)
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Table 6 shows that, while the five refusal grounds are present in all
33 treaties, five other treaties actually have additional refusal grounds.
For example, in the bilateral treaties in France and Spain, an additional
refusal ground is that a foreign judgment will be rejected if, in terms of a
natural person’s status and civil capacities, F1 does not apply the choice
of law rule of F2, unless the substantive law applied by F1 led to the same
result as the choice of law of F2.54 For the five general refusal grounds,
the similarities of the relevant provisions among the bilateral treaties are
very limited, as shown in the discussion below.
1. Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment
Table 7 - Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment
Type of Formulation

No. of Countries

%

Not
effective
or
unenforceable under F1 law
Not final or unenforceable
under F1 law
Not effective under F1 law

20

61%

8

24%

2

6%

Not final or unenforceable
under F1 law; Not
enforceable under F2 law

2

6%

Not
certain
or
unenforceable under F1 law

1

3%

Total

33

100%

All treaties have articles requiring that the foreign judgment has
become legally effective under the law of F1. However, the details of
such articles vary across different treaties. It is common for
commentators to over-generalize these articles as requiring the judgment
to be “not effective or unenforceable” under F1 law.55 As Table 7 shows,
however, only 20 of the 33 treaties adopt such a formulation. The rest of
the treaties adopt alternative formulas. For example, eight of the treaties
provide that the foreign judgment can be rejected for enforcement if they
54. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz. art. 22(2),
May 4, 1987, [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal
Affairs, China-Spain, art. 22(2), May 2, 1992, [no official citation available]. Cf. HUANG, supra
note 52 (referring only to France having such a requirement).
55. See YONGPING XIAO, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2007) (stating
only such formulation as the requirement of the bilateral treaties. In particularly, reference was
made to the treaties with Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Poland, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan. However, France, Bulgaria, Morocco and Italy all in fact have different formulations.).
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are not final or are unenforceable under F1 law. It is unclear whether there
is a real difference between a legally effective judgment and a final
judgment.56 What makes it even more complicated is the fact that the
treaties with Laos and Cyprus both add an extra requirement on
enforceability of judgments. Under both treaties, enforceability is not
only required under F1 law but also under F2 law.57
Even if the 20 treaties which adopt the “effectiveness and
enforceable” format account for the majority, one must not forget that the
actual requirements vary substantially across different countries on what
constitutes “legally effective,” “enforceable” and “final.” Since the
relevant provisions in the 33 treaties all have F1 law as the governing law,
it is foreseeable that these terms might not always mean the same thing
in different jurisdictions.
Finally, the general requirement of Articles 281 and 282 is that the
judgment must be “effective.”58 No definition is provided for the term
“effective” in the Civil Procedure Law, nor is there any reference to
“final” or “unenforceable.”59 There is also no specification in the
governing law of the effectiveness requirement. As argued above, where
there is a discrepancy between bilateral treaties and the Civil Procedure
Law, the provision in bilateral treaties will prevail.60 It is therefore
submitted that parties should only consider the relevant provision of the
bilateral treaty under F1 law if there exists a bilateral treaty between F1
and China. On the other hand, in cases where there is no bilateral treaty,
parties should be cautious in drawing an analogy with the relevant
provisions of the bilateral treaty in the interpretation of effectiveness in
reciprocity cases.61

56. Whether there is a difference shall ultimately depend on the law of F1. However, see
discussion on Schneider Electric SA v. Xu Xiao-Xu, Chongqing No. 1 IPC, (2011), Yu Yi Zhong
Fa Min Chu Zi No. 385, infra note 159 below.
57. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Laos, art. 21, Jan. 25,
1999, [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs,
China-Cyprus, art. 25, Apr. 25, 1995, [no official citation available].
58. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2.
59. Id.
60. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE
LEIGH, supra note 44.
61. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note
54 art. 22(2) [no official citation available]; the treaty with France, the first ever bilateral treaty
signed by the PRC adopts the rare “not certain or unenforceable” format, and does not use the term
“effective” in the treaty. For practice of discussing the respective requirement under the bilateral
treaties and Civil Procedure Law as if they are the same, see Xiao, supra note 55, at 25.
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2. Jurisdictional Requirement
Table 8 – Jurisdictional Requirement
Type
1
Exclusive
Jurisdiction
Only
List
of
Countries
No.
of
Countries
Percentage

–

Type
2
Respective
Jurisdiction

–

Type
3
Objective
Jurisdiction

–

Total

8

14

11

33

24%

42%

33%

100%

All 33 treaties require the judgment rendering court to have satisfied
some jurisdiction requirements, but such requirements vary across the
bilateral treaties. There are generally three types of jurisdictional
requirements.62 The first type simply requires the foreign judgment not to
be in an area that is designated as the exclusive jurisdiction of F2. Thus,
when China is the judgment enforcing country, reference will need to be
made to the jurisdictional rules of China and particularly the rules
regarding exclusive jurisdiction. For example, if the foreign judgment is
on immovable properties located in China, it will be a ground to reject
the enforcement in China since immovable property is designated as
being subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chinese courts.63
The second type of jurisdiction requirement is much broader than
the first type and requires the F1 court to have complied with the
jurisdiction requirements of F2 as if the latter is taking the case in the first
place. This will have the effect of equating the direct jurisdictional rules

62. These three types of indirect jurisdictional bases are recognized by a number of
commentators, despite not giving them the same labels herein. See, e.g., TANG ET AL., supra note
26.
63. See Moses, supra note 5, at 110. (“The Civil Procedure Law contains provisions
concerning exclusive jurisdiction, one of the most important principles of which states that a dispute
over real estate shall be under the jurisdiction of the court where the property is located [under CPL,
Art 34]. In relation to foreign-related disputes, Article [266] provides that disputes related to joint
venture contracts or joint exploration and development of natural resources shall be under the
jurisdiction of the people’s courts. Such disputes may be arbitrated, but may not be heard by a court
outside of China.”).
This is actually one of the advantages of arbitration over litigation for disputes involving China.
See supra note 5, at 4 (“it should be noted that PRC law prohibits parties from submitting certain
disputes to foreign courts, but does allow the parties to select arbitration [under CPL, arts. 34 and
246]. The types of disputes covered include those involving real estate and natural resources
projects and those arising out of Sino-foreign joint ventures.”).
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with the indirect jurisdictional rules in enforcement.64 Thus, if France
rendered a judgment on the sole basis that the plaintiff is a French
national,65 and no other jurisdictional basis is found, enforcement of this
French judgment could be rejected in China since the Chinese nationality
of the plaintiff is not a basis for Chinese courts to take jurisdiction if the
case were to be tried in China.66
Finally, instead of having regard to the direct jurisdictional rules of
F2, some bilateral treaties set out a laundry list of acceptable
jurisdictional bases. However, these jurisdictional bases are still subject
to the exclusive jurisdictional bases of F2. Thus, even if having a business
representative in F1 is an acceptable jurisdictional basis under the SinoSpanish bilateral treaty in business disputes,67 the Spanish judgment
would not be enforceable in China if, for example, the business dispute
is on the equity interests in a Sino-foreign joint venture which is one of
the areas designated as being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Chinese courts.68 Some commentators have argued that there were no
such reservations of exclusive jurisdiction in the Type 3 bilateral treaties,
but this is simply incorrect as a matter of fact.69
The distributions of the three types of jurisdiction requirement are
relatively even as shown in Table 8 above. Although Type 2 constitutes
the majority, it consists of no more than 42% of the 33 treaties. 70 Type 1
which has the fewest treaties adopted still constitutes 24%.
Looking at the three types of jurisdiction bases, it is clear that the
common thread is the exclusive jurisdiction reserved for Chinese law, but
there is substantial difference beyond that, with Type 1 being the easiest
to enforce and Type 2 being the most difficult.

64. The term indirect jurisdiction is often used in Chinese legal literature, see, e.g., ZHONGBO
ZHANG, STUDY ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (GUOJI SIFA XUE) 497 (2012). For a general
discussion of direct and indirect jurisdictions, see Huang, supra note 52 at 220-23.
65. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 14 (Fr.).
66. See Arts. 265-66, Civil Procedure Law.
67. See Arts. 21(1)(2) and 22(1) and of Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal
Affairs on 2 May 1992 between the PRC and Spain.
68. See Arts. 21(2)(1) and 22(1) of Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs
on 2 May 1992 between the PRC and Spain, and art. 266 of the Civil Procedure Law.
69. TANG ET AL., supra note 26. (“Exclusive jurisdiction in Chinese domestic law has a broad
scope, which makes it easy to conflict with the treaty jurisdiction rules. Taking the China-Spain
Treaty as an example, it does not expressly reserve exclusive jurisdiction rules of either country
and the treaty jurisdiction rules are only consistent with the Chinese exclusive jurisdiction in terms
of succession and immoveable property.”). The authors have simply omitted art. 22(1)(2) which
provides that the objective jurisdictional bases are subject to the regulations on exclusive
jurisdiction of both countries.
70. MOSER, supra note 5, at 45-92.

FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/15/2017 8:49 PM

Chinese Bilateral Judgment Enforcement Treaties

19

Chinese commentators generally criticize Type 2 but prefer Type 3.
According to them, Type 2 is problematic because “the diversity of
domestic jurisdiction rules would render many judgments given by a
court duly taking jurisdiction under its domestic law unenforceable in the
other contracting state.”71 While this criticism against Type 2 may be
justified, the preference for Type 3 is not. Commentators praised the
objectivity of Type 3 rule as one that promotes certainty,72 but this is far
from the truth. In fact, the jurisdiction requirements for the enforcement
of foreign judgments in China are relatively certain for Types 1 and 2 –
one only needs to check the relevant exclusive jurisdictional bases of
China for Type 1 and the general jurisdictional bases of China for Type
2 respectively. However, the requirements for Type 3 vary substantially.
In total, there are 16 different jurisdictional bases that have been
adopted by 33 bilateral treaties. These range from bases that all treaties
have adopted, such as F2 being the location of the immovable property
or the place of residence of the defendant, to bases that only a few
jurisdictions have adopted, such as the place of the debtor for custody
cases.73 More importantly, it is unclear which law is to be applied to
determine whether the jurisdictional bases are satisfied. Most of the
treaties are silent as to the governing law. This will be particularly
problematic if the laws of F1 and F2 are different in a given jurisdictional
basis.

71. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 154.
72. See WEIZUO CHEN, COMPARATIVE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (2008).
73. Detailed Breakdown of Objective Jurisdiction Bases
Jurisdictional Basis
Location of Immovable Property
Defendant Place of Residence
Business – Place of Agent
Contract – Place of Performance
Contract – Location of Subject Matter
Contract – Place of Execution
Tort – Place of Act
Tort – Place of Consequence
Preliminary Action
Exclusive Jurisdiction of F2
Succession – Place of Death of Deceased or Place where Major Assets are
Located
Explicit Jurisdiction Agreement
Defendant Defensed on Merit and Did not Argue on Jurisdiction
Status – Place of the Subject Person
Custody – Place of Debtor
Defendant’s representative in F2

No. of Country
11
11
10
11
9
9
11
9
2
11
7
11
8
5
6
1
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For example, while the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty provides that the
F1 court will have jurisdiction over a contractual dispute if F1 is the place
of performance of the contract,74 the definition of place of performance is
different under PRC law and Italian law when it is not specified clearly
in the contract. Under PRC law, when the place of performance is not
specified in the contract, it is presumed as the place where the recipient
of money is located if the subject matter of dispute is the payment of
money.75 However, under Italian law, in the case of the sale of goods, the
place of performance is presumed to be the place where the goods were
delivered, or should have been delivered.76 Thus, in a sale of goods
contract between a Chinese seller and an Italian buyer, if there is no
jurisdiction clause nor a specific provision designating the place of
performance, the place of performance will be presumed to be China
under Chinese law, assuming that is where payment will be received,
while it will be presumed to be Italy assuming delivery will be made in
Italy. Note that the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates provide that F1’s determination of objective jurisdictional bases
shall be binding on F2 unless it is a default judgment.77 However, there is
no equivalent in the rest of the Type 3 bilateral treaties and one simply
cannot assume such a requirement is implied because of the existence of
such articles in the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates. The Type 3 treaties would be much improved if clauses, like
those in the bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates,
or further guidance within the treaty were included.
Finally, it must be noted that Chinese scholars have generally argued
that a jurisdictional requirement is necessary in all enforcement cases,
including cases not under the bilateral treaties regime (meaning therefore
under the reciprocity regime), even though this is not stated in Articles
281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Law.78 On many occasions, the
justification is simply that jurisdiction is a common requirement in the
bilateral treaties.79 One commentator further argued that jurisdiction
74. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., art. 22(2), May 20,
1991, [no official citation available].
75. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 16, art. 18.
76. See Reform of the Italian System of Private International Law, Law No. 218, art. 32, May
31, 1995.
77. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., art. 20, Apr.
21, 2004 [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial
Affairs, China-Kuwait, art. 20, June 18, 2007, ST. COUNCIL GAZ. [no official citation available].
78. See QU GUANG QING, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 153 (Beijing Law Press,
2004); see also WENLIANG ZHANG, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
IN CHINA: RULES, PRACTICES, AND STRATEGIES (Kluwer Law International, 2014).
79. Id.
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should be included under reciprocity since there is “no justification for
Chinese national law to grant an even more favorable treatment by
relinquishing the jurisdictional requirement, to judgments from the
countries having no such bilateral agreements with China.”80 The validity
of this argument, however, depends on how stringent the reciprocity
requirement is, but it is certainly not supported by judicial practice. There
is no reported case under the reciprocity regime that failed on lack of
jurisdiction. Moreover, even without jurisdiction as a refusal ground,
reciprocity appears to be much more difficult to satisfy than bilateral
treaties. While the success rate under bilateral treaties is not high, 81 there
is only one successful case under reciprocity. 82
Even if it makes sense to include jurisdiction in the reciprocity
regime, it is submitted that its omission should only been seen as
regrettable, and one cannot imply such a requirement without solid legal
sources.
3. Improper Procedure in the F1 Proceeding83
Table 9 - Improper Procedure in the F1 Proceedings
Summon
legal rep
under F1
law

Summon
under F1
law

Legal
rep
under
F1
law

Summon,
defend
legal rep
under F1
law

Summon
under F1
law;
legal rep
under F2
law

Summon
under F1
law;
legal rep
(law not
specified)

Summon
under F1
law;
defend/
rep (law
not
specified)

Total

23
70%

3
9%

1
3%

2
6%

2
6%

1
3%

1
3%

33
100%

In all 33 bilateral treaties, there are also refusal grounds that can be
broadly categorized as ways to examine whether the proceedings in F1
are proper. Commentators again like to over-generalize the requirement.84
However, the detailed requirements indeed vary between bilateral
treaties.

80. Id.
81. See infra Section IV.
82. See Kolmar Group AG v. Jiangsu Textile Industry (Group) Import & Export

Co., Ltd. (2016) Su01 Assisting Foreign Recognition No 3.
83. TANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 150-151
84. MOSER, supra note 5.
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As Table 9 above shows, 23 of the 33 bilateral treaties provide that
(1) the defendant must be summoned if absent from the proceedings, and
(2) where the defendant is not capable, then he must receive proper legal
representation.85 Both these requirements are governed by the law of the
judgment rendering country. However, in the remaining 10 bilateral
treaties, the requirements are not the same. Some treaties only provide for
one of the two aforementioned F1 procedural requirements (three only
provide for proper summoning, and one only provides proper legal
representation). Two treaties provide for an additional F1 procedural
requirement, namely, the defendant has been provided with the
opportunity to properly defend himself or herself in the F1 proceedings.
Some treaties vary in the law governing the F1 procedural requirement.
For example, two treaties state that the summoning requirement will be
governed by the law of F1, while the requirement on legal representation
will be governed by the law of F2. Some treaties do not specify the law
governing some of the requirements. Finally, even among the 23 treaties
that provide for proper summoning and legal representation, since they
are all subject to F1 law, such as the requirement on effectiveness, the
actual applications of this requirement could be very different depending
on the F1 law involved.86
There is no equivalent requirement under the reciprocity regime.87
One could, however, argue that the requirement is partly contained in
Article 543 of the 2015 Interpretation which provides that “[i]f the
judgment or ruling rendered by the foreign court is a default judgment or
ruling, the applicant shall, at the same time, submit the certification
documents on a legal summons from the foreign court.”88 That being said,
Article 543 does not state that non-compliance will result in refusal of
enforcement. Accordingly, like jurisdiction, it would not be proper to
include improper procedure as a refusal ground for the reciprocity
regime.

85. Id. (Note that the latter requirement was sometimes omitted by commentators).
86. For a brief summary of the equivalent rules under Chinese law, see supra note 5, 117-118,
see MOSER, supra note 5, at 117-118 ( “After the receipt of the complaint, the defendant is granted
a certain period to respond to the complaint by a written acknowledgement. During this period, the
defendant may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the dispute by filing an objection, on grounds
of [subject matter jurisdiction], by territory, by agreement, exclusive jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens… The court is required to review the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding with trial
procedures, and to make a decision and issue an order accordingly. The defendant is entitled to a
reconsideration if the defendant is not satisfied with the order.”).
87. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial Implementation), supra
note 9, art. 281-282.
88. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 16, art. 543.
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4. Parallel Proceedings89
Table 10 - Parallel Proceedings
F2 made judgment + in process
+enforced 3rd country judgment

21

64%

F2 made judgment + enforced 3rd
country judgment
F2 made judgment + in process (before
F1) +enforced 3rd country judgment
F2 made judgment + in process (before
F1)
F2 in process (before F1) or enforced 3rd
country judgment

5

15%

3

9%

2

6%

1

3%

F2 initiated proceeding
Total

1
33

3%
100%

In all 33 bilateral treaties, F2 may refuse enforcement of the foreign
judgment if it has engaged in some form of parallel proceedings. Some
commentators simply refer to a requirement to ensure “an effective
judgment has been issued by a People’s court for the same cause of action
between the same parties.”90 However, the differences between the
bilateral treaties are significant as reflected in Table 10.
The most common provision is that F2 (1) has already made a
judgment, (2) has a proceeding in process, or (3) has enforced a judgment
from a third country that involved the same parties and subject matter. 91
This provision accounts for 21 of the 33 bilateral treaties. However, 12
other treaties have different requirements. For example, five treaties only
cover the first and third types of parallel proceedings above, while three
other treaties specify that for parallel proceedings in process in F2 (the
second situation above), the proceedings must be initiated prior to the one
which rendered the judgment in F1. Together, there are six different sets
of requirements.

89. HUANG, supra note 52.
90. MOSER, supra note 5, at 398.
91. One commentator claimed that only Poland and France treaties have such requirements,
see DEPEI HAN, RESEARCH ON CHINESE CONFLICT OF LAWS 399 (1993); However, even at the
time it was written, at least one more bilateral treaty contains such requirements, see Judicial
Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Mong., art. 18(3), Aug. 31, 1989 [no official
citation available].
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Article 522 of the 2015 Interpretation provides for a similar
requirement.92 Under the said article, a foreign judgment will be rejected
if the Chinese court has already rendered a judgment on the same action
between the parties at the time of the enforcement request.93 This
requirement is expressly subject to international treaties. 94 Since all
bilateral treaties have covered this ground, it is submitted that there will
not be direct conflict in practice, but the bilateral treaties are apparently
broader in scope.
This Article is significant for two additional reasons. First, parallel
proceedings have never been an express refusal ground under Articles
281 and 282, nor their predecessors. The SPC was of the opinion that this
is an essential addition thereto.95 However, the SPC has never done the
same for the jurisdiction requirement which is also not an express ground
covered by Articles 281 and 282, thus adding to the argument against
such a requirement being implied in the reciprocity regime.96 Second, the
fact that the provision is expressly subject to treaties is further
confirmation by the SPC that the treaties are to prevail in case of conflict
between the treaties and Civil Procedure Law.97

92. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 75, art. 522.
93. See Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application
of
the
Civil
Procedure
Law
of
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
(promulgated by Judicial Interpretation No.22 [1922] of the Supreme People’s Court, Jul. 14,
1992) art. 306, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=2408&l=en.. (“For the
cases over which both the people’s court of the People’s Republic of China and the foreign court
have jurisdiction, if one party files a lawsuit with the foreign court but the other party files a lawsuit
with the people’s court of the People’s Republic of China, the people’s court may accept the case.
If, after a judgment was rendered, the foreign court or one party requests the people’s court’s to
recognize and enforce the judgment or ruling rendered by the foreign court concerning this case,
the people’s court shall not consent to the request, unless it is otherwise prescribed by an
international treaty concluded or acceded to by both countries.”).
94. Id.
95. In fact, the same requirement could be found as early as 1992 when the SPC promulgated
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Civil
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China. Id.
96. See QING supra note 78, at 92.
97. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE
LEIGH, supra note 44.
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5. Public Policy
Table 11 - Public Policy
Public Policy Requirement

No. of
Treaties

%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Non-judicial

13
3

39%
9%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Significant public interest/
Basic legal principles/ Non-judicial

3

9%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic legal
principles

2

6%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Constitutional
principles/ Current law
Sovereignty/ Security/ Significant public interest/
Basic legal principles
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic interests

2

6%

2

6%

2

6%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Social public
order/ Non-judicial

1

3%

F2 Basic principles
Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order / Basic Interest/
Basic legal principles/

1
1

3%
3%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Basic interest/
Basic legal principles

1

3%

Sovereignty/ Security (decided by F2)/ Basic legal
principles

1

3%

Sovereignty/ Security/ Public order/ Significant
interests

1

3%

The bilateral treaties all provide that the foreign judgment will not
be enforced if it is contrary to the public policy of F2. However, despite
a view to the contrary, the formulations of what constitutes “public
policy” vary.98
The definitions of all but one treaty include sovereignty and national
security of F2.99 However, all of them include additional elements beyond
sovereignty and national security. Together, there are thirteen different
98. For common formulation, see e.g. MOSER supra note 5, at 398 (“recognition and
enforcement of the foreign court judgment would cause harm to the national, social or public
interests of the PRC.”).
99. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Hung., art. 17, Oct.
9, 1995, [no official citation available].
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formulations of the public policy requirement. The most common
formulation is sovereignty, security and public order, but it still only
accounts for thirteen of the thirty-three treaties. More importantly, since
no definition for these different terms has ever been provided in any of
the relevant treaties, it is not clear what each of them mean. For example,
are “significant public interests” the same as “significant interests”?100 Or
is there any real difference between “significant interests” and “basic
interests”?101 This uncertainty echoes the observation of Chinese scholars
on ordre public in general who called the doctrine “neither precise nor
uniform.”102
Further, Article 282 provides generally that enforcement of a
judgment should be subject to the foreign judgment not being inconsistent
with China’s sovereignty, security, public order and basic legal
principles.103 These terms are not defined there either.104 In Table 11, only
two treaties adopt the same formulation.105 If the public policy
requirements in the treaties are in conflict with Article 282, the treaties’
requirement shall prevail.106

100. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Arg., art. 7, Aug. 31,
1989, [no official citation available]. (providing for “significant public interests”), and Judicial
Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Lith., art. 9, Mar. 20, 2000, [no official
citation available] (providing for “significant interests”).
101. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Lith., supra note 100,
art. 9, [no official citation available] (providing for “significant interests”), and Judicial Assistance
Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Egypt, art. 20, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official
citation available] (providing for “basic interests”).
102. See Yongping Xiao & Zhengxin Huo, Ordre Public in China’s Private International Law,
53 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 659 (2005).
103. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, at Art. 282. This provision can in fact be traced
back to Article 204 of the Civil Procedure Law (Trial Implementation)(1982), the earliest law that
adopted the doctrine of ordre public in a formal manner. See also id. at 656.
104. See id.
105. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cuba, art. 13, Mar.
20, 2000, [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs,
China-Ukr., art. 11, Apr. 21, 1994, [no official citation available].
106. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE
LEIGH, supra note 44, at 163.
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6. Document Inconformity
Finally, it must be noted that all treaties provide for the documents
to be submitted in the enforcement proceedings in F2. 107 However, as
Table 6 has shown, only one treaty expressly provides that inconformity
to the document requirement could lead to lack of enforcement.108 As will
be seen in Section D, the lack of a relevant refusal ground may have led
to the Chinese courts applying public policy as a ground of rejection in
case of documentary inconformity.109
C. Other Aspects
1. Partial Enforcement
Table 12 – Partial Enforcement

No. of Treaties

Partial
Provided
10

Percentage

30%

Enforcement

Partial Enforcement Not
Provided
23
70%

Generally, if a foreign judgment falls within the scope of the treaty
and is not rejected on any of the refusal grounds set out above, the
judgment will prima facie be enforceable in China. But what if only part
of the foreign judgment fails on one or more of the aforementioned
refusal grounds? What will be the consequence in that case? Presumably,
that would mean the foreign judgment is not enforceable at all. However,
in 10 of the 33 treaties, it is expressly provided that the foreign judgment
can be partially enforced.110 This is achieved by not enforcing the part that
is contrary to the enforcement conditions.111

107. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, ChinaLith., supra note 100, art. 17(2), [no official citation available] (requiring the
submission to F2 documents, such as copy of the foreign judgment, document
proving proper summons of the defendant in case of default judgment, and proof of
proper legal representation of legally incapable defendant).
108. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Arg.,supra note 100,
art. 18(5), Aug. 31, 1989, [no official citation available].
109. See infra Section D.
110. See bilateral treaties with Greece, Kuwait, Bulgaria, Argentina, Brazil, United Arab
Emirates, Algeria, Peru, Tunisia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
111. Id.
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2. Party Initiating Enforcement Proceedings
Table 13 – Party Initiating Enforcement Proceedings
Who can
initiate

No.
of
Treaties
33

Party can directly file with no conditions
Party
Party
Party
Directly
Directly, or Directly, or
Party
F1 Court
through F1 Directly
Court
8
8
10

Party cannot directly file
Party through Court
F1 Court, or Directly
Party Directly if
Resident in F2

26

7

6

1

Who can initiate the enforcement proceedings? Under the bilateral
treaties, there are five different formulas which consist of combinations
of initiations of the proceedings by the litigating party, and/or by the
court. At one end, eight treaties allow only the party to file directly for
enforcement in China. At the other, one treaty allows only the F1 court
to file for enforcement.112 However, in most cases it is a combination of
both. In eight treaties, the party can file either directly in the F2 court or
through the F1 court. In ten other treaties, both the F1 court and the party
can file directly in the F2 court. In total, there are 26 treaties that make it
possible for the party to file directly without any conditions. On the other
hand, apart from one treaty which only allows the F1 court to file an
enforcement directly, there are six other treaties that allow the party to
file an enforcement directly to F2 but only if the filing party is resident in
China.
This is to be contrasted with the requirement under Article 281.
Generally, China allows both the parties and the F1 court to file the
foreign judgment enforcement directly in Chinese courts.113 Again, when
the requirement of Article 281 is in conflict with the relevant requirement
in the treaties, the treaties’ requirement shall prevail.114
3. Definition of Judgment
Finally, there could be further complications regarding the
definition of “judgment.” Although the majority of treaties define

112. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Affairs, China-Turk.,
art. 21(1), Sept. 28, 1992, [no official citation available].
113. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 2, art. 281.
114. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MONROE
LEIGH, supra note 44, at 163
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“judgment” to include a “mediation agreement,”115 treaties with France
and Algeria do not have the same provision.116 In addition, for the treaties
with Italy, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, it is provided that the
enforcement mediation agreement is only subject to compliance with the
public policy of F2 without reference to any of the other refusal grounds
above.117
Having regard to the various differences between the bilateral
treaties, one can easily see the substantial variety, from the scope of the
treaties and enforcement conditions, to other enforcement aspects. With
all these differences, it is safe to say that no treaties are identical. This is
hardly surprising considering that each of the treaties were entered into
with a different country, at different times and under different negotiation
backgrounds. While China might have initiated the negotiation of a given
bilateral treaty using certain standard forms of treaty provisions, it is
natural that the final products have deviated as a result of the actual
negotiations. Even if the same terminology is used, it is expected that
different countries might have a different understanding of it. Without a
neutral umpire like the European Court of Justice in the Brussels
Regulations, all the treaties provide that any disputes over the meaning
of the treaties will be resolved ultimately by diplomatic negotiations.118
The interpretation of certain terms in one treaty cannot therefore be relied
on in another treaty. It is even more dangerous to use the provision and/or
interpretation thereof to interpret the requirements under the reciprocity
regime. Apart from avoiding these pitfalls, it is submitted that there exists
plenty of uncertainties from the examination of treaties. The following

115. For a brief summary of mediation in Chinese court, see Moser, supra note 5, at 125, 369.
See also MOSER, supra note 5, at 367. (“Mediation, also referred to as “conciliation,” is an informal
dispute resolution process whereby a mediator or neutral third party is used to facilitate negotiation
and resolution between parties. There are many forms of mediation, ranging from collaborative to
adversarial, informal to formal. Additionally, mediation can occur at anytime during the dispute,
from inception to post-award.”). See also MOSER, supra note 5, at 375. (“In civil suits, the courts
are authorized to resolve disputes by mediation with the consent of the parties. This can occur at
the courts initiative at anytime including after the close of trial prior to the issuance of a judgment.
Mediation is generally not a separate process and judge has a lot of discretionary power to direct
the parties.”).
116. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note
54 [no official citation available] and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs,
China-Alg., Jan. 10, 2010, [no official citation available].
117. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra note
77, art. 25, [no official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial
Affairs, China-Kuwait, supra note 77, art. 25, and Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal
Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, art. 27[no official citation available].
118. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra
note 77, art. 28 [no official citation available].
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section seeks to explore whether such uncertainties could be clarified by
Chinese courts in actual cases.
IV. JUDICIAL PRACTICES RELATING TO BILATERAL TREATIES
The cases were identified mainly through search phrases in four
databases, China Judgement Online, LawinfoChina, Westlaw and
LexisNexis. The first database is the official database of the Supreme
People’s Court.119 LawinfoChina has been widely regarded as the best
commercial database on Chinese cases,120 while the latter two are market
leaders in case databases worldwide. This is further supplemented by
cases discussed in books, articles and other trustworthy sources that
contain enforcement cases. For a case to be an enforcement case,
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment must have been sought
in a Chinese court therein. The survey identified in total 2,846
enforcement cases in China as of December 31, 2016, the last full
calendar year at the time this article was written.
Table 14 - Enforcement Cases in China
No. of cases
Percentage

Treaties Cases

Reciprocity Cases

Total

29
1%

2,817
99%

2,846
100%

It has always been the belief of commentators that enforcements of
foreign judgments in China pursuant to bilateral treaties are rare.121 Of the
2,846 enforcement cases, only 29 fall into treaty cases, which are defined
in this article as cases involving enforcement of judicial decisions
rendered by the court of a foreign state that has entered into a bilateral
treaty with China on enforcement of judgments (hereinafter “treaty
cases.”) These treaty cases account for less than one percent of all
enforcement cases, and the remaining cases are all cases under the
reciprocity regime (hereinafter “reciprocity cases”). Government data
released by the Ministry of Justice also supported the small number of
treaty cases. For example, in the five years between 2010 and 2014, there
119. China Judgments Online, Index, WENSHU COURT, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/Index.
120. See Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It
Heading?, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743, 747 (2012) (calling the database “authoritative and widelyused”).
121. See MOSER, supra note 5, at 398 (“In practice, there is a very limited record of
enforcement of foreign court judgments in the PRC pursuant to the Sino-foreign judicial assistance
treaties. In one case, involving a judgment issued by an Italian court, recognition was successful).
See also Jingxia Shi, Recent Developments in Chinese Cross-Border Insolvencies, 2002 AUSTL. J.
CORP. L. 18, 6 (2002).

FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

6/15/2017 8:49 PM

Chinese Bilateral Judgment Enforcement Treaties

31

were reportedly more than 3,100 cases regarding judicial assistance
annually, of which only five cases were on judgment enforcement
(0.16%).122 In the first six months of 2015, there were 1,040 cases
regarding judicial assistance generally, but only seven cases were on
judgment enforcement (0.67%).123 In the first nine months of 2016, there
were 1,928 cases regarding judicial assistance generally, but only
fourteen cases were on judgment enforcement (0.73%).124 In addition,
the government statistics do not make it clear that these enforcement
cases are necessarily treaty cases, making them potentially rarer in
practice.
Similar searches have been performed with the case databases in
France125 and Russia;126 both are key trading partners of China (ranking
as the 20th and 16th largest trading partners of China as of 2015,
respectively)127and both have been in bilateral treaties with China for a
long time (1987 for the French treaty and 1992 for the Russian treaty).
There was only one divorce case that can be identified in the French
database128 and there is no relevant case in the Russian database. These
limited data seem to suggest that the bilateral treaties are not only
inefficient in enforcing foreign judgments in China, but also inefficient
in enforcing Chinese judgments in the foreign signatories.
All of the above suggests that the bilateral treaties are not effective
in enforcing foreign judgments in China. The real issue that requires our
attention is the reason behind such ineffectiveness.
A. Not All Treaty Cases Applied the Treaties
While it is expected that the treaty cases will be decided based on
the application of the relevant treaty, only eighteen cases (62%) cited the
treaties in the judgment. For the remaining eleven cases (38%), the
relevant treaties were never referred to, even though the cases were
122. See Overview of Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs,
MINISTRY OF JUST. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/201412/17/content_5890548.htm?node=24391.
123. See Statistic on Judicial Assistance on Civil and Commercial Affairs cases in the first half
of 2015, MINISTRY OF JUST. (Jul. 27, 2015), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/201507/27/content_6190902.htm?node=24391.
124. See Judicial Statistics on Civil and Commercial Matters, MINISTRY OF JUST. (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.moj.gov.cn/sfxzjlzx/content/2016-09/26/content_6817093.htm?node=24391.
125. Search has been performed using phrases “4 mai 1987” + “entraide” in legifrance.gouv.fr.
126. Search has been performed in http://www.consultant.ru.
127. Russia and France were the 3rd and 4th largest trading partners of China in 2015 among the
33 countries, just behind Vietnam and Brazil. See infra Table 1.
128. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 25, 2016, 1514754 (Fr.).
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rendered by the court of a country which had such a bilateral treaty with
China. The low percentage of treaty cases utilizing the bilateral treaties
suggests that not all Chinese judges are even aware of the existence of
the bilateral treaties.
B. Success Rate is Not High
Table 15 - Success Rate

No.
Cases

of

Percentage

Enforced

Recognized

Partially
Enforced/
Recognized

Denied

Total

2

12

7

8

29

7%

41%

24%

28%

100

Only about half of the treaties cases were either fully enforced or
recognized. Eight cases were completely rejected and six were partially
rejected. The low success rate will no doubt negatively affect the
motivation of the litigating parties to utilize the bilateral treaties to seek
enforcement in China. Table 16 below summarizes the bases of
rejections.
Table 16 - Rejection Grounds
Bases of Rejections

No. of Cases

Percentage

Public policy
Ineffective judgment

3
1

7%
7%

Document inconformity
Involvement of 3rd party interest

1
1

20%
7%

Improper venue
Not presented for enforcement

1
1

7%
7%

No explanation
Total

7
15

47%
7%

The first observation on the grounds of denial is the small number
of cases that were denied under the official rejection grounds of the
bilateral treaties. No case actually failed for lack of jurisdiction, F1
improper procedure, or parallel proceedings. Only one case failed on
ineffective judgment and three cases failed on public policy. In other
words, Chinese courts have been finding additional grounds to reject
enforcement beyond the specified refusal grounds. Among these cases,
seven of them (almost half of the failed cases) are without explanation in
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the judgments. The different grounds of rejection will be examined in
turn below.
1. Public Policy
As the designated “very unruly horse,”129 Chinese academics echoed
the pledge of their counterparts in the west to limit the application of
public policy.130 It should be “interpreted restrictively and invoked
prudently.”131 With three of the 15 rejections coming from public policy,
it certainly demands deeper examination, particularly when two such
cases were actually decided by the Supreme People’s Court.
In Minsk Automatic Production Corporation United v. CNMTC,132
the judgment creditor sought to enforce a judgment from the Supreme
Economic Court of the Republic of Belarus in the No. 2 Intermediate
Court of Beijing.133 It was argued that the judgment could not be enforced
because it had been served on the defendant in China directly by post by
the Belarus court instead of through the relevant Chinese authority. Since
service by post is neither allowed under the Hague Service Convention134
nor the Sino-Belarusian bilateral treaty,135 the enforcement was rejected.
This was confirmed by the Supreme People’s Court.136
The most controversial part of the judgment was the basis of
rejection. The Beijing court suggested that it should be rejected under
Article 21(5) of the Sino-Belarusian bilateral treaty.137 This basis of
rejection was expressly approved by the Supreme People’s Court in its
reply to the Beijing court.138 As Article 21(5) provides for rejection due
to contravention of F2’s sovereignty, security and public order, the case
is thus categorized as failing on public policy in Table 16 above, even
129. See Xiao & Huo, supra note 102, 654.
130. See SHUANGYUAN LI, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 612
(1996) (arguing that China should avoid utilizing public policy to reject judicial assistance to
foreign countries as much as possible in practice for fear of adversely affecting comity).
131. See Xiao & Huo, supra note 102, 676.
132. Minsk Automatic Production Corp. United v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG MIN RENZI NO. 01815
(No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001); Supreme Econ. Ct. of the Rep. of Belr. v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG
MIN RENZI NO. 01817 (No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001) (China).
133. Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on Application
of Minsk Automation Production Line United Corp. for Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment
of the Supreme Econ. Tribunal of the Republic of Belarus (date unavailable).
134. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 [no official citation available].
135. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Belr., art. 8, Jan. 11,
1993, [no official citation available].
136. See supra note 133.
137. See supra note 132.
138. See supra note 133.
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though neither the Supreme People’s Court nor the Beijing No. 2
Intermediate Court explained why the improper service constituted a
breach of Chinese public policy.
This issue was subsequently discussed in the Chorvanaslxizmat
139
case. Similar to Minsk Automatic Production, the Uzbekistan summons
and judgment were not served in compliance with the Sino-Uzbek
bilateral treaty.140 As such, upon submission from the High Court of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Supreme People’s Court again
utilized the public policy section of the Sino-Uzbek bilateral treaty141 to
reject enforcement.142 Most importantly, the Supreme People’s Court
explained that it was a breach of public policy since the failure of proper
service constituted a breach of the judicial sovereignty of China.143
It is submitted that the Supreme People’s Court has interpreted
public policy too extensively in both cases. It can be recalled that in
Section C improper procedure in an F1 proceeding is an established
ground for refusal.144 However, the relevant articles in the bilateral
treaties (including the bilateral treaties with Uzbekistan and Belarus) do
not contain any requirement on improper service of judgment.145 Even if
the Sino-Uzbek treaty did contain a requirement on the service of
summons, it is explicitly governed by the law of F1 (Uzbekistan law). 146
Thus, it seems that the Supreme People’s Court felt compelled to utilize
the public policy exception as a catch-all provision.
However, this takes the public policy exception too far for a
technical breach of procedure, and there are certainly alternative ways to
reach the same result within the framework of the treaties. First, in both
treaties, the articles containing the specified refusal grounds are not

139. Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on
Chorvanaslxizmat case, Aug. 6, 2001 (Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 6, 2011) (China).
140. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., art. 3, Dec. 11,
1997, [no official citation available].
141. See id., art. 21(5)(providing for refusal of enforcement if the foreign judgment is in
violation of F2’s “sovereignty, security and public order.”
142. See Letter of Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on Request for Instructions on
Chorvanaslxizmat case, supra note 139.
143. Id.
144. See supra Section III(A)(3).
145. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140,
art. 21 (3), [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs,
China-Belr. art. 21, Jan. 11, 1993, [no official citation available].
146. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140,
art. 21 (3)[no official citation available].
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described as exhaustive,147 and it is thus possible to reject enforcement on
other grounds. The best way to handle this procedural irregularity is to
reject the enforcement proceeding for failing to observe procedural law
which is reserved by both bilateral treaties to be governed by F2 law (and
in this case, Chinese law).148 When service of foreign judgment is not in
compliance with the bilateral treaties, the service could only be legally
effective if it is in compliance with the default Chinese law.149 When the
service fails under the default Chinese procedural law, the foreign
judgment can be rejected accordingly. This is no different from rejecting
the enforcement of a foreign judgment based on the violation of a
limitation period under Chinese procedural law.150
Another case that was rejected on public policy grounds is
Application of Li Yili for recognition and enforcement of foreign court
judgment and civil ruling.151 It was a partially recognized/enforced case.
The foreign judgment involved was an Italian judgment that held, inter
alia, (1) that the couple was to be divorced, (2) the custody of the couple’s
son and maintenance arrangement, (3) the distribution of real properties
(both in Italy and China) and (4) the debt involving the couple’s car.
When recognition and enforcement were sought in China, the court only
agreed to recognize the divorce part of the judgment, but refused to
enforce the latter parts. The reasoning provided by the court was that the
latter parts of the Italian judgment were contrary to the public policy of
China as they contravened the basic principles of the Chinese Marriage
Law.152
It is submitted again that the court in this case applied the public
policy ground too lightly. Under each of the bilateral treaties (including
the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty), the merits of the case cannot be opened
by the F2 court.153 The governing law of divorce chosen under the conflict
rules of F1 should be regarded as a substantive matter and should be
147. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Uzb., supra note 140,
art. 21 (3) [no official citation available]; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs,
China-Belr., supra note 135, art. 21, [no official citation available].
148. See id.
149. Minsk Automatic Production Corp. United v. CNMTC, ER ZHONG MIN RENZI NO. 01815
(No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2001) (China) (apparently, this is why the Hague Service Convention
was discussed in the Minsk Automation Production case.)
150. See Supreme People’s Court, Interpretation of the SPC on the Application of the PRC
Civil Procedure Law art. 547 (2015), www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/2649/3380/23
(hereinafter 2015 Interpretation).
151. Application of Li Yili for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgment and
Civil Ruling (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Jan. 21, 2010).
152. Id.
153. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, art.
25(2) [no official citation available].
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recognized in the F2 court, unless it is so offensive as to violate the public
policy of F2. It is also interesting to note that the public policy exception
in the Sino-Italian bilateral treaty only refers to “sovereignty, security and
public order,”154 but not “basic legal principles” as some other treaties
do.155
The non-divorce part of the judgment, while it might not be the kind
of judgment awarded by a Chinese court under Chinese family law, does
not appear to be an extreme type either. The real problem probably lies
in the allocation of matrimonial property located in China under the
Italian judgment. The court could have easily rejected the enforcement of
this part of the judgment by utilizing the article in the Sino-Italian
bilateral treaty that specifically reserves the exclusive jurisdictions of
F2.156 Regarding the custody arrangement and the debt of the couple’s
car, there is simply no indication in the judgment that they are offensive
to the “sovereignty, security and public order” of China.157 The fact that
the court did not cite the Sino-Italian treaty in the judgment seems to
suggest that the court might not have been aware of the existence of the
Italian Treaty.158
Thus, having regard to the three public policy cases above, it is clear
that the Chinese courts have overused the public policy ground as a basis
of rejection unnecessarily. Instead, the Chinese courts should have
utilized the more rule-based grounds to reach the same results. These
cases therefore have done little to clarify the uncertainty involving public
policy but have set up bad precedents for future cases.

154. See id., art. 21(6).
155. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cuba, supra note 105,
art. 13, [no official citation available].
156. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, at
art. 22(2). For discussion on reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in bilateral treaties in general, see
supra note 69.
157. Note that if there were no bilateral treaty, such arrangements included in a foreign divorce
judgment will not generally be enforced under the Supreme People’s Court. Supreme People’s
Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling Petition for
Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra note 3. See further discussions
in infra Section D(2)(iv).
158. See supra Section IV(1).
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2. Ineffective Judgment
Another ground for refusal that has been utilized in the court is
ineffective judgment. In Schneider Electric SA v Xu Xiao-Xu,159 the
Chinese court rejected enforcement by citing the lack of effectiveness of
the French judgment under French law. It argued that since it was
possible under French law to appeal the case, the judgment was therefore
ineffective.160 However, this reasoning is problematic for various reasons.
First, the judgment seems to suggest that the possibility of an appeal of
the judgment equates to ineffectiveness. This is a very narrow reading of
effectiveness and also does not fit with the literal meaning of the terms
used in the Sino-French bilateral treaty. Under Article 22(3) of the treaty,
a foreign judgment can be rejected if it is “not certain or
unenforceable.”161 There was also no report of the defendant appealing
the case in France; therefore, the appeal was no more than a possibility.
If one adopts the Chinese court’s interpretation, a foreign judgment could
only be effective if all the appellate processes in F1 have been exhausted.
Such interpretation will have the effect of substantially restricting the
applicability of the bilateral treaty.
More importantly, Article 22(3) is expressly subject to French law.
In the case, the judgment creditor actually submitted to the Chinese court
a certification of effectiveness of judgment issued by the Paris appellate
court. Although Article 22(3) falls short of saying that the French court’s
determination of effectiveness is binding and conclusive, the French
court’s certification appears to be the best proof one can get of the
effectiveness of the French judgment under French law. It seems absurd
that the Chinese court could just overrule such certification according to
its own interpretation of French law, particularly when there was no
record of an expert witness on French law in the judgment. Accordingly,
the Schneider case is another bad precedent by the PRC court to reject
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
A better way to achieve the same result is to attack the enforcement
request on the ground of improper service of judgment. The case actually
pointed to the service of judgment and other required documents not
meeting the requirements of the Sino-French bilateral treaty.162 This is
similar to what happened in Chorvanaslxizmat and Minsk Automatic
159. Schneider Electric SA v. Xu Xiao-Xu, Chongqing No. 1 IPC, (2011), Yu Yi Zhong Fa
Min Chu Zi No. 285.
160. Id.
161. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Fr., art. 22(3), May
4, 1987.
162. See id., art. 22(3).
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Production (discussed above). Instead of utilizing public policy, the court
in Schneider opted to reject the case on the grounds of ineffectiveness.
The case would have been far better handled if the court had just rejected
enforcement based on the judgment creditor’s failure to comply first with
the service requirement under the Sino-French bilateral treaty,163 and then
the default procedural rule on service under Chinese law.164
3. Document Inconformity
In Iras-engineering Ltd. v. Jiangsu Hengyuan Machinofacture
Co.,Ltd. and Jiangsu Hengyuan International Engineering Group,165 the
court rejected enforcement of the default judgment from Kazakhstan
because the plaintiff failed to produce documentary proof that the
defendant was properly summoned under Article 18(2) of the SinoKazakh bilateral treaty in time.166 Document inconformity is not a
specified ground of refusal under the treaty,167 but failure to observe the
proper summoning of the defendant at the F1 proceeding is. 168 When the
treaty expressly requires the plaintiff to produce proof of proper
summoning, the burden of proving this appears to lie with the plaintiff.
Thus, the most appropriate way to handle the decision is to refuse
enforcement based on improper procedure in F1 proceedings. While this
decision is clearly better than the one handed down in Chorvanaslxizmat
and Minsk Automatic Production, as the court did not try to force the
decision into public policy, it clearly passed on an opportunity to apply
the proper refusal ground.169
4. Other Rejection Grounds
This part covers rejection grounds that do not appear in Section C(b)
above. In Re Petition of B&T Ceramic Group SRL for Recognition and
Enforcement of the Judgment on Bankruptcy Rendered by the Italian

163. Id., art. 23(1).
164. See id.
165. Iras-engineering Ltd. v. Jiangsu Hengyuan Machinofacture Co., Ltd. & Jiangsu
Hengyuan International Engineering Group, Mar. 28, 2012 (Yangzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Dec.
12, 2012) (China).
166. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Kaz., art. 18(2), Jan.
14, 1993, [no official citation available].
167. See id., art 21.
168. See id., art 21(3).
169. It is also possible to adopt similar reasoning advanced above in discussion of
Chorvanaslxizmat case and Minsk Automatic Production case, namely, failure to comply with
treaty service requirement and also the default Chinese procedural law.
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Court,170 a claimant sought to enforce an Italian insolvency judgment in
China. While the court recognized the Italian insolvency judgment, it held
that it could not enforce the judgment by transferring the shares of PRC
assets to the liquidator because the shares had been transferred to a third
party.
Two points can be noted. First, the involvement of a third party
interest is not a ground for rejection under the Sino-Italian bilateral
treaty,171 and the court failed to refer to any provision for the want of third
party protection. Second, the scope of the treaty only covers judgments
on civil, criminal compensation, commercial, marriage and labor, but not
bankruptcy or insolvency.172 While the Chinese court may be commended
for being willing to consider enforcement of a foreign judgment that does
not clearly fall into the specified scope of the treaty, this case again shows
the difficulty of fitting a square peg into a round hole.173
Two other cases were rejected on procedural grounds, though not
expressly stated in the relevant bilateral treaties. In Wu Yonglin and Chen
Alan v. Zhang Wencheng,174 and Tedelon Holding Group Co., Ltd. v.
F.A.C.I.BDICORTESI&C.S.P.A.,175 the foreign judgments were rejected
because enforcement proceedings were filed at the wrong venue in China
and for failure to present the case for enforcement.176 While these refusal
grounds are not expressly specified in the respective treaties, 177 they do
fit within the argument that China should be able to refuse enforcement
of a judgment for failing Chinese procedural requirements.
Finally, there is a high percentage of unexplained rejections. Five of
these seven cases are partially recognized/enforced cases involving
foreign divorce judgments which are similar to the Li Yili case.178 In these
170. Judgment on Bankruptcy Rendered by the Italian Court, Guangdong Province Foushan
IPC, CLI.C.829134.
171. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74, at
art. 21
172. See id., arts. 1, 20.
173. For a general discussion of the difficulty of enforcing foreign bankruptcy judgment in
China, See Emily Lee, Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border
Insolvency Lee Matters between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 439 (2015).
174. Wu & Chen v. Zhang (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Ct. Aug. 22, 2012) (China) (The civil
judgment of second instance of dispute over right to life, health and body on Aug. 1, 2012).
175. Tedelon Holding Group Co., Ltd. v. F.A.C.I.BDICORTESI & C.S.P.A., (Hangzhou
Interm. People’s Ct. Apr. 22, 2014) (China).
176. See id.
177. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Fr., supra note
161, at art. 22; Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74,
at art. 21.
178. Application of Li Yili for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgment and
Civil Ruling, supra note 151.
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five judgments, the Chinese courts simply stated that the foreign divorces
decrees were recognized without reference to other parts of the judgments
that required enforcement. The effect, therefore, is the same as the Li Yili
case,179 but for the lack of express rejection and reasoning. Again, this
might be attributed to a lack of understanding of the treaties.180 Under
reciprocity enforcement, divorce cases are generally recognized, but the
property distribution, custody, and maintenance parts of the foreign
judgment will not be enforced.181 These cases might therefore have been
wrongly decided because of a lack of awareness or understanding of the
bilateral treaties. In any event, the Chinese courts should have specified
the reason for rejection as they are generally required to do so under the
bilateral treaties.182
In short, the low success rate could be attributed to uncertainties
resulting from the lack of understanding of the treaties by Chinese courts
(both in scope and refusal grounds), and, particularly, the over-utilization
of the public policy exception. Instead of clarifying the uncertainties
discussed in Section D, examination of the cases actually shows further
confusion.
C. Treaties Are Ineffective in Enforcing Commercial Cases
Table 17 - Type of Cases

No. of
cases
%
Success
case
Success
rate

General
Commercial
6

Marriage
/ Family
18

Insolvency

IP

Total

1

Criminal
Compensation
1

3

21%

62%

10%

3%

3%

100%

2

12

1

0

0

33%

33%

33%

0%

0%

29

The majority of the cases are family cases, accounting for eighteen
of the twenty-nine treaty cases. Considering one of the perceived
functions of an enforcement treaty is to promote economic
179. Id.
180. Two of these five cases did not refer to the relevant bilateral treaty.
181. See Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s
Courts’ Handling Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra
note 3, art. 2.
182. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Rom., art. 22(2),
Jan. 16, 1991, [no official citation available].
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developments,183 the small amount of commercial cases (eleven out of
twenty-nine, combining general commercial, insolvency and IP) is
disappointing. The success rate is also slightly lower than family cases
(27% to 33%). Further, the Chinese courts have been willing to go beyond
the expressly specified scopes of the treaties. Both IP and insolvency are
not within the range of the scope of treaties set out in Table 4. While
judicial creativity might be admirable, it does create further uncertainties
on the scope of the treaties, as seen in the discussion on the B&T Ceramic
Group case above.
In summary, treaty cases are rare, especially regarding the trading
volume of the thirty-three countries, as well as, in comparison to the
reciprocity regime. This could be attributed to the Chinese courts’ lack of
awareness of the treaties, the uncertainties in the treaties (both because of
their drafting and subsequent interpretation by the courts), and the
ineffectiveness in enforcing commercial judgments. Considering that the
first bilateral treaty with France entered into force in 1987, the current
stage of the bilateral treaties regime is disappointing. The next section
explores whether China should be a signatory to the Hague Convention
and if that will present an improvement.
V. HAGUE CONVENTION
Commentators have spent a disproportionate amount of time
debating whether China should join the Hague Convention.184 Since the
European Union, Mexico and Singapore have ratified the Convention, it
has become effective.185 Its influence is only going to grow as soon as the
United States, which has already signed the Convention, ratifies it.186
However, whether to join the Convention is a much bigger question as it
involves considering China’s whole enforcement regime, particularly the
issue of reciprocity. The structure of the Convention can be compared to
the existing bilateral treaties. This will shed light on whether the
Convention is conceptually acceptable to China.

183. Twenty-seven of the thirty-three bilateral treaties expressly provided for enforcement of
commercial judgments. In addition, foreign divorce judgments are generally recognized (though
not enforced) by the Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling
Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, and thus one can argue
that the real value of the bilateral treaties is in the enforcement of commercial judgments. See
Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on Relevant Questions Concerning People’s Courts’ Handling
Petition for Recognition of Divorce Judgment Made by a Foreign Court, supra note 3.
184. See Tu, supra note 8.
185. See Hague Convention of Private International Law, Status Table, Jun. 6, 2016,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98.
186. See id.
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The Hague Convention is modeled on the Brussels Convention,187
which facilitates enforcement of judgments through harmonizing the
jurisdictional rules of member states.188 Due to the need to compromise
the different views on the proper bases of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional
ground of the final version of the Hague Convention is only limited to
jurisdiction agreement, which makes it similar to the New York
Convention.189
Previously, some commentators compared the jurisdictional bases
of the Hague Convention with the direct jurisdictional bases of China.190
While this is certainly relevant, it will also be essential to compare the
enforcement bases of China against its counterpart to the Hague
Convention.
The Hague Convention governs three different roles that a member
state plays: (1) the court that is designated as the court with jurisdiction
by the jurisdiction agreement,191 (2) the court that is not designated by the
jurisdiction agreement but is where the proceeding is initiated,192 and (3)
the court that is to enforce the judgment rendered by a court designated
by the jurisdiction agreement.193 Since the bilateral treaties do not set out
requirements on the first two roles, the last role is the most relevant for
our purposes. The first two roles will only be briefly set out below.
A. Role 1 – Court Designated by the Jurisdiction Agreement
The basic jurisdictional requirement of the Hague Convention is
found in Article 5(1) which provides that the court of a Contracting State
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have
jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that
state.194 There is no question that a jurisdiction agreement can enable a
PRC court to assume jurisdiction generally if it is designated as such by
the agreement.195 However, the fact that the jurisdiction agreement could

187. See CHRISTOPHER CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.
2011), 183.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Tu, supra note 8.
191. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 5.
192. See id. art. 6.
193. See id. arts. 8, 9.
194. See id. art. 5.
195. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 531 (The parties to a dispute over a foreignrelated contract or any other right or interest in property may, by a written agreement, choose the
foreign court at the place of domicile of the defendant, at the place where the contract is performed
or signed, at the place of domicile of the plaintiff, at the place where the subject matter is located,
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potentially be void under Chinese law196narrows the application of the
Convention. This includes (a) only foreign related matters can have
jurisdiction agreement,197 and foreign joint venture and wholly-owned
foreign enterprises are not considered a foreign party; (b) the chosen
jurisdiction must have an actual connection with the dispute; 198 and (c)
some matters are reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of China.199 While
these matters could be excluded from the scope expressly pursuant to
Article 21 of the Convention, it would substantially limit the
effectiveness of the Convention.200 One commentator even called the
exclusion mechanism of Article 21 a “Trojan Horse” in effect, “with the
potential to reduce the Convention to a hollow shell.”201
Further, under Article 5(2), a court designated by the jurisdictional
agreement should not decline to exercise jurisdiction because the case
should be decided in a court of another state. This will not be a problem
to China even if it has now recognized the principle of forum non
conveniens under Article 532 of the 2015 Interpretation.202 One of the
conditions of its application, however, is the lack of an agreement
specifying the jurisdiction of a court of the PRC.203 Accordingly, the
restriction under Article 5(2) of The Hague Convention exists under
current Chinese law.
B. Role 2 – Court Not Designated by the Jurisdiction Agreement
Unless expressly allowed under Article 6 of The Hague Convention,
a court not designated by the jurisdiction agreement shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which the jurisdiction agreement applies.204 This
again involves forum non conveniens. Under Article 532 of the 2015
Interpretation, China can theoretically decline such proceedings, but it is
up to the Chinese court’s discretion after considering a list of factors,
which does not include a jurisdiction agreement in favor of a foreign
at the place where the infringement is conducted or at any other place actually connected to the
dispute to have jurisdiction over the dispute.).
196. See id. (definition of “foreign related” matters); see 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, at
art. 522.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art.

21.
201. See Richard Garnett, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much
Ado About Nothing?, 5(1) J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 161, 176 (2009).
202. 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 532.
203. See id. art. 532(2).
204. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 6.
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court.205 Thus, adjustments are required to meet the requirements under
Article 6 of The Hague Convention.
C. Role 3 – Court Requested to Enforce Judgment from Another
Signatory
This role is the most relevant to our discussion. The question is the
extent to which the experience of the bilateral treaties provides a blueprint
as a matter of legal framework for joining The Hague Convention.
Throughout this section, treaty precedents will be used to compare the
corresponding requirements under The Hague Convention. This is by no
means to suggest that the relevant bilateral treaty provision is universal
among the treaties, but simply an indicator that China has previously
agreed to a similar arrangement.
1. Jurisdictional Bases
The enforcement provisions under The Hague Convention are found
in Articles 8 and 9.206 Generally, a judgment given by a court chosen by
the jurisdiction agreement shall be recognized and enforced in other
Contracting States unless otherwise specified.207
The question, therefore, is whether under the existing bilateral
treaties, a jurisdiction agreement is an acceptable indirect jurisdictional
basis.208 As mentioned in Table 8 and the accompanying discussions,
there are three types of jurisdictional bases.209 The exclusive jurisdiction
bases are the common thread among the three types of jurisdiction
bases.210 For the Convention’s requirement on jurisdiction agreement to
fit with the indirect jurisdictional bases of China’s bilateral treaties
regime, the bottom line is that the exclusive jurisdiction bases of China
must be expressly reserved under Article 21 from the Hague
Convention.211
In particular, for Type 1, exclusive jurisdiction, as long as the
foreign judgment does not concern the exclusive jurisdiction of China,
then it will be enforced. For Type 3, objective jurisdictional bases, the
205. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3, art. 532.
206. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, arts. 8 & 9.
207. See id., art. 8(1).
208. One commentator compares the direct jurisdictional basis under Chinese law with that of
the Hague Convention. See Tu, supra note 8. However, since direct and indirect jurisdictional bases
may be different under current Chinese law (Type 2 is the same, but not the other two types), it is
more appropriate to compare the indirect jurisdiction bases instead.
209. See supra Table 8.
210. See id.
211. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 21.
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Chinese will enforce a judgment that is based on an express jurisdiction
agreement. While there is no difference in exclusiveness under such
treaties,212 it should not be a problem as the current requirement is broader
than that of The Hague Convention. In addition, exclusiveness is
presumed unless contrary intention is proved under The Hague
Convention.213 This will further narrow the gap between the two regimes.
For Type 2, respective jurisdiction, a foreign judgment will be
enforced in China if its jurisdiction basis is acceptable under Chinese
jurisdiction rules. Thus, the analysis will be the same as in Role 1 above.
Apart from the exclusive jurisdictional bases, additional reservations will
have to be made to exclude jurisdiction agreements such as (a) foreignrelated, and (b) substantial connection between the dispute and the
designated court.214 That said, most foreign judgments that satisfy Article
3 of The Hague Convention are expected to be able to meet this additional
requirement in practice. In the end, China has certainly accepted different
types of indirect jurisdiction (see Types 1 & 3); therefore, this should not
be a main problem even if these extra reservations are not made under
Article 21 of The Hague Convention.
2. No Review on Merits
Article 8(2) provides that F2 cannot review the merits of the foreign
judgments, unless the judgment in question was given by default. Almost
all bilateral treaties require that the Chinese courts cannot review the
merits of the foreign judgment.215 In fact, no exception is made for a
default judgment. Again, the existing enforcement regime under the
bilateral treaties has been shown to be even more flexible on this point.
3. Effectiveness of Foreign Judgment
Under Article 8(3), a foreign judgment will be recognized only if it
has effect in F1 and enforced only if it is enforceable in F1. 216 As
mentioned in Section C, the ineffectiveness of a foreign judgment is one
of the common refusal grounds in bilateral treaties.217 While the

212. See e.g. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-It., supra note 74
(providing that F1 court will have jurisdiction if the defendant has explicitly accept the jurisdiction
thereof).
213. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 3(b).
214. See 2015 Interpretation, supra note 3.
215. The only exceptions are the bilateral treaties with Poland and Romania.
216. Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(3).
217. See supra Table 7.
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formulations vary, the relevant clauses are always governed by F1 law
which is the same as the requirement under Article 8(3).218
4. Refusal Grounds
Article 9 of The Hague Convention provides for a number of refusal
grounds against the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.219
In Article 9(a), enforcement may be refused if the jurisdiction agreement
was null and void under the law of the state of the chosen court. Among
the three types of jurisdiction bases, this does not appear to be a problem
in Types 1 and 3. For Type 1, as long as it is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction, there is no additional requirement on the jurisdiction
agreement. For Type 3, most treaties opting for objective jurisdiction
bases do not provide for which law governs the jurisdiction agreement
and the governing law question remains unresolved.220 However, in the
bilateral treaties with Kuwait and the UAE, satisfaction of the objective
jurisdictional bases is expressly provided to be conclusively decided by
F1 court.221 Thus, arguably, China could accept this rejection ground
based on F1 law. Type 2 is more problematic. As mentioned above, this
will have to make reference to Chinese law which may be different
substantially from F1 law.222 This is, however, just one of the three types
of jurisdiction.
Article 9(b) provides that a party’s inability to conclude the
agreement under the F2 law is a ground of rejection.223 This is not
expressly provided for in the bilateral treaties. This restriction could
arguably be present in bilateral treaties adopting Type 3 jurisdiction bases
which could reject such an agreement for failing to have a valid
jurisdiction agreement. Alternatively, an even worse possibility is to
reject on the ground of public policy.224 However, the case must be really
extreme to apply, such as if the agreement was entered into by a person
without mental capacity. The PRC law on capacity is rather reasonable

218. See id.
219. This Article is expressed as “may be refused,” implying that F2 court could still
enforce/recognize the foreign judgment in the appropriate case. This is similar to most of the treaties
(three provide the conditions in positive manner). See supra note 51.
220. See Section C(B)(2).
221. Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-U.A.E., supra note 77.
222. See discussion in supra Section D – Role 1.
223. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(b).
224. See discussion in supra Section III(B)(5).
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and will only hold a contracting party incapable of entering into a contract
if he or she lacks of mental capacity or is underage.225
Article 9(c) rejects enforcement on improper procedure in F1
proceedings.226 In particular, enforcement will be rejected if (i) the
defendant was not notified of the document instituting the proceedings in
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his
defence, or (ii) it was notified to the defendant in F1 in a manner that is
incompatible with fundamental principles of F2 concerning service of
documents.227 This clause fits with most of the F1 procedural clauses in
the bilateral treaties. As seen in Table 9, most bilateral treaties reject
enforcement for lack of a proper summons under F1 law.228 A few of them
will also reject enforcement for lack of an opportunity to arrange for a
proper defence. It is noted, however, “no proper legal representative,” a
rather common ground for rejection, is not a basis for rejection under the
Hague Convention, although China has entered into bilateral treaties
without such grounds.229 For (ii) above, this is not expressly provided for
in the bilateral treaties. As mentioned in the discussion on
Chorvanaslxizmat and Minsk Automatic Production, the Supreme
People’s Court actually utilized the public policy ground to reject
enforcement. Adopting the Hague Convention will therefore be an
improvement as it will limit the occasions where public policy is utilized
and limit the potential to be trampled on by the “unruly horse.”
Article 9(d) rejects enforcement of a judgment that was obtained by
fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.230 This, again, is not
expressly provided for in the bilateral treaties nor discussed in any case.
It has been suggested that fraud could be covered by public policy under
the current enforcement regime in China.231 Thus, China should not have
a problem with this ground of rejection. If China were to adopt the Hague
Convention, fraud would become an express ground of rejection and the
225. See General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at Fourth
Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) art. 11, 13
(China).
226. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(c).
227. Id.
228. See supra Table 9.
229. See Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Commercial Affairs, China-Kaz., supra note
54, art. 22(4) [no official citation available], Judicial Assistance Treaty in Civil and Criminal
Affairs, China-Laos, supra note 51, art. 21(3)[no official citation available], and Judicial Assistance
Treaty in Civil and Criminal Affairs, China-Cyprus, supra note 51, art. 25(3) [no official citation
available].
230. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 7, art. 9(d).
231. See Zhang, supra note 78, 164-65 (“recourse to [the fraud] defense by Chinese courts in
the course of the [recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments] in China is probably in the
name of the public policy exception.”).
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enforcement regime would be improved by reserving public policy for
the really extreme cases.
Article 9(e) provides a ground of refusal on the basis of F2’s public
policy.232 This clause basically equates the public policy clauses of the
bilateral treaties. It must be emphasized, however, that this ground is only
limited to those cases where it would be manifestly incompatible with the
public policy of F2, including situations where the specific proceedings
leading to the judgment were incompatible with the fundamental
principles of procedural fairness of that state. Thus, the Hague
Convention has made an effort to limit the scope of application of the
public policy ground. With the establishment of Articles 9(c)(ii) and 9(d)
on separate grounds, this article is clearly narrower than those of the
bilateral treaties. Adopting this format would therefore be an
improvement on the current regime.
Finally, Articles 9(f) and (g) reject enforcement in parallel
proceedings.233 If the foreign judgment is inconsistent with (i) a judgment
given in F2 in a dispute between the same parties, or (ii) an earlier
judgment given in another state between the same parties on the same
cause of action, enforcement would be rejected.234 As shown in Table 10,
bilateral treaties usually cover both grounds, and, in fact, at times go
beyond that to include cases where Chinese proceedings on the same
matter between the parties have been initiated at the time of the request.235
But China has clearly accepted these types of parallel proceedings
provisions previously.236
In the end, three observations can be made after comparing the
Hague Convention with the bilateral treaties. First, the bilateral treaties
have mostly covered all the grounds of enforcement and rejection
contained in the Hague Convention. They are certainly not identical, but
they can serve as precedents where China has agreed to similar
arrangements. Second, even in cases where they are different, bilateral
treaties’ grounds for rejection are generally more lenient. Thus, agreeing
to the Hague Convention would not open the floodgates. The added
restrictions in the Hague Convention also appear to be optional,237 so it
would not substantially damage the Chinese court’s flexibility which it
has enjoyed thus far.
232. See id. art. 9(e).
233. See id. art. 9(f)-(g).
234. Id.
235. See supra Table 10.
236. See bilateral treaties with France (art. 22(6)), Vietnam (art. 17(4)), UAE (art.21(6)), Egypt
(art. 21(4)) and Brazil (art 23(4)-(5)).
237. See supra Section III(A)(1).
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Finally, on public policy, the Hague Convention makes a number of
possible public policy rejections into separate, bright-lined rejection
grounds. This will have the effect of limiting the opportunity to utilize
the public policy ground and give more certainty to the parties.
In conclusion, the adoption of the Hague Convention will not be
problematic from the perspective of the legal design, compared with the
existing bilateral treaties. If anything, it will be an improvement,
particularly regarding the design of the rejection ground on public policy.
The legal design is, however, only one perspective for consideration by
the Chinese government. The enforcement regime of China also involves
reciprocity. Due consideration should also be paid to the comparison
between China and other countries in terms of the number of judgments
as well as the judgment amounts. Before this decision to join the Hague
Convention is made, China will continue to enter into new bilateral
treaties with her trading partners. In these negotiations, however, China
should try to include more guidelines in the areas discussed in Section C.
In particular, an explicit refusal ground on improper service under F2 law
should be added to avoid reliance on the public policy exception in
relevant cases.

